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i  I n t r o d u c t i o n
A rgum ent quality plays an im portant role in popular m odels o f  
the persuasion process, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM; Petty &  Cacioppo, 19 8 6 ) and the H euristic System atic 
M odel (HSM ; Chailcen, 1987). According to these m odels, argu­
m ent quality determ ines the outcom e o f  the persuasion process 
i f  people are m otivated and able to scrutinize the m essage. 
M cG uire (2000) notes that given the im portance o f argum ent 
quality for persuasion, rem arkably little research has been done 
that addresses the question whether the strength o f argum ents is 
related to the type o f warrant or type o f  evidence that is used. In 
this paper, we try to contribute to answ ering this question.
1.1 Argum ents in persuasive documents: the importance o f  prob­
ability and desirability
Persuasive docum ents are often designed to influence people’s 
behavior: to quit sm oking, to drink less, or to buy a Volkswagen 
beetle. The usually im plicit claim  is that the propagated behavior, 
for instance, quitting sm oking, is better than the alternative 
behavior (continuing to sm oke, drink heavily, or buy another 
m ake o f  car). C laim s about the (relative) favorableness o f  an 
option are often backed up by pragm atic argum entation (van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeclc H enkem ans et al., 19 9 6 , in -112 ). 
In this type o f argumentation, the claim  is supported by referring 
to the favorable consequences that acceptance o f  the claim  w ill 
have. For instance, as a result o f  no longer sm oking, it is argued 
that your chances o f dying o f  lung cancer or o f  a heart attack are 
reduced, your physical condition im proves, and your breath 
sm ells fresher.
Crucial to the persuasiveness o f  this type o f  argum entation is 
that the audience accepts the desirability o f  the consequences and 
that it regards it as plausible that the propagated behavior will 
indeed lead to these consequences. A  strong argum ent in favor 
o f  such a claim  w ould be that the behavior very probably w ill 
result in a very desirable consequence. A  strong argum ent against 
such a claim  would be that the behavior w ill very probably result 
in a very undesirable consequence. I f  the audience does not read­
ily accept the consequence’s probability or desirability, you have 
to provide evidence to back up your claim.
The audience m ay doubt a consequence’s desirability as well as 
its probability. A reni and Lutz (1988) claim  that assessing a con­
sequence’s desirability is easier than assessing  a consequence’s 
probability. For instance, people m ay find  it hard to assess the 
probability o f a new heating system  lowering heating costs while 
it is easy for them  to assess the desirability o f  a cost reduction. 
Therefore, you would expect to encounter evidence in support o f 
a probability claim  m ore often than evidence in support o f  a 
desirability claim.
This expectation is supported by Schellens and De Jong’s study 
(2000 ). They analyzed the occurrence o f  evidence in twenty 
Dutch Public Service A nnouncem ent docum ents. W ith respect 
to evidence supporting desirability they conclude that the desir­
ability o f  certain consequences (e.g. self-assurance, cheerfulness)
has to speak for itse lf and no evidence is provided (or necessary). 
In this paper, we focus on the evidence that can be provided to 
support probability claims.
1.2  Different types o f  evidence
Claim s about the probability o f  a consequence can be supported 
by several types o f  evidence. This paper distinguishes between 
four types o f  evidence: anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert 
evidence. Following Rieke and Sillars (1984, p. 92), we consider 
anecdotal evidence as the presentation o f  exam ples and illustra­
tions. Statistical evidence is the num erical com pacting o f specific 
instances (Rieke &  Sillars, 19 8 4 , p. 94). The u se  o f  causal evi­
dence im plies the prediction (or explanation) o f  a certain event 
on the basis o f  causal relations. Expert evidence constitutes citing 
an authority’s opinion (Rieke &  Sillars, 198 4 , p. 94).
The choice o f these four evidence types is based on two lines o f 
reasoning. First, the (relative) persuasiveness o f each o f these evi­
dence types has already been the subject o f  em pirical research. A 
review o f  this research is given in the next paragraph. By focus­
ing on these sam e types o f  evidence, the predictive and explana­
tory force o f  the results is stronger.
The second line o f  reason ing is that the types o f  evidence 
resem ble the m ajor classes o f  research techniques in  social sci­
ences. Elmes, Kantowitz and Roediger (1989, p. 15) state that sci­
ence is a valid way to acquire knowledge about the world around 
us, i.e scientists produce know ledge about the probability o f 
events. A s such, their research provides evidence to support 
probability claim s about the occurrence o f  events.
Elm es et al. (19 8 9 , p. 17) d istingu ish  betw een three m ajor 
classes o f  research techniques: observation, correlation, and 
experim entation. A  prim e exam ple o f  observation is the case 
study: people are interviewed in depth to acquire descriptive h is­
tories. As such, the case study provides anecdotal evidence. Cor­
relation is the assessm en t o f  the co-occurrence o f  certain vari­
ables, e.g. voting behavior and socio-econom ic status. These 
correlations are often based on large-scale surveys that produce 
statistical evidence. Experim entation aim s at explaining the rela­
tionship betw een variables in  term s o f  cause-and-effect. A  suc­
cessful experim ent provides causal evidence. Expert evidence is 
not produced by a research technique, but it is often used in 
reporting on research. It is com m on practice to support claims in 
introductions o f research papers by referring to experts who have 
forwarded the claim.
1.3 Empirical research on the relative persuasiveness o f  different 
types o f evidence
A num ber o f  studies exam ined the relative persuasiveness o f  dif­
ferent types o f  evidence. The m ost frequently studied comparison 
is the one between anecdotal and statistical evidence. Baesler and 
Burgoon (1994) review the results o f  19  studies in which the per­
suasiveness o f anecdotal evidence was com pared to that o f  statis­
tical evidence. In 13 studies, anecdotal evidence proved to be more 
persuasive than statistical evidence, in 2 studies the reverse pat­
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tern was found, and the rem aining 4 studies reported no sign ifi­
cant differences. This review seem s to indicate quite clearly that 
anecdotal evidence is m ore persuasive than statistical evidence.
However, Baesler and Burgoon (1994) note that in m any o f the 
studies the num ber o f cases represented is not the only difference 
between anecdotal and statistical evidence. The anecdotal evidence 
was often longer, m ore com prehensible, and m ore vivid than the 
statistical evidence. Baesler and Burgoon conducted an experi­
m ent in which they m anipulated the num ber o f  instances that 
were reported on in the evidence while keeping the length, com ­
prehensibility, and vividness o f the anecdotal and statistical evi­
dence constant. Their results showed that the statistical evidence 
was m ore persuasive than the anecdotal evidence as long as the 
other factors were kept constant. These results suggest that the 
results o f  studies show ing that anecdotal evidence is m ore per­
suasive than statistical evidence should be interpreted as showing 
that vivid evidence is m ore persuasive than pallid evidence.
H oeken (2001a) tried to replicate the results reported on by 
Baesler and Burgoon. H e had participants rate the probability o f 
the claim  that “putting extra streetlights on the sidewalks in the 
town o f  H aalcsbergen w ould resu lt in a sharp decrease o f  the 
num ber o f  bu rglaries” . This claim  was supported either by sta­
tistical evidence or by two types o f  anecdotal evidence. The sta­
tistical evidence referred to a study conducted by the Dutch 
organization o f  m unicipalities on the results o f putting extra 
streetlights on sidew alks in 48 Dutch towns. T his had led to a 
4 2%  average decrease in the num ber o f burglaries. The anecdotal 
evidence referred to the experiences o f  another Dutch town in 
which putting extra streetlights on the sidewalk led to a decrease 
in the num ber o f burglaries by 42% . This other town resem bled 
Haalcsbergen either very m uch (sim ilar anecdotal) or very little 
(dissim ilar anecdotal evidence).
The participants in this study rated the sim ilar and dissim ilar 
anecdotal and statistical evidence as equally vivid. They rated the 
d issim ilar anecdotal evidence as less relevant than the sim ilar 
anecdotal evidence and the statistical evidence. The latter two did 
not differ from  each other with respect to the relevance ratings. 
However, the acceptance o f the probability claim  that installing 
additional streetlights would result in a sharp decrease in the 
num ber o f  burglaries, was not influenced by the type o f evidence 
provided. That is, regardless o f  whether the evidence was statis­
tical, anecdotal sim ilar or anecdotal d issim ilar, the claim  was 
accepted to the sam e degree.
It seem s contradictory that participants were equally persuaded 
by the sim ilar and the dissim ilar evidence despite the fact that 
they considered the latter type o f evidence less relevant. This dis­
crepancy m ay be the resu lt o f  the order in  w hich the different 
questions were asked. Their opinion on the evidence’s relevance 
was asked after they had rated the acceptability o f  the claim. Pos­
sibly, the participants only realized that the d issim ilar evidence 
was less relevant when asked to reflect upon it.
The results o f  H oeken (2001a) differ from  those o f Baesler and 
Burgoon (1994). Whereas the latter report that statistical evidence 
is m ore persuasive than anecdotal evidence when controlling for 
vividness, the form er reports no difference in persuasiveness 
between the two types o f evidence. Perhaps this result was caused 
by the fact that upon a superficial inspection, all types o f evidence 
contain statistical inform ation (a decrease o f  the num ber o f  bur­
glaries by 42% ). For the anecdotal evidence, this percentage is 
based upon the experience o f  one town, for the statistical evi­
dence the percentage is the average percentage o f  48 towns. The 
participants m ay have overlooked this difference.
In  a follow-up study, Hoeken (2001b) again com pared the rela­
tive persuasiveness o f anecdotal and statistical evidence. In this 
experim ent, the claim  was about the probability o f  a m ultifun c­
tional cultural center in the town o f Doetinchem being profitable. 
Once again, the statistical evidence consisted o f  a study by the
Dutch organization o f  m unicipalities on the profitability o f such 
centers in  a large num ber o f Dutch towns. The anecdotal evi­
dence consisted o f  the experience o f  the town o f G roningen with 
the m ulti-functional cultural center that had been built there. 
Groningen is very dissim ilar to Doetinchem  thereby constituting 
dissim ilar anecdotal evidence. This was done because the sim i­
larity o f the evidence had no effect in the previous study.
Apart from  the anecdotal and statistical evidence, H oeken 
(2001b) introduced a third evidence type: causal evidence. The 
causal evidence consisted o f three reasons why the cultural cen­
ter in Doetinchem  would be a success. First, m any citizens from  
D oetinchem  went to visit a cultural center far away. Second, a 
popular movie theatre in a nearby town had burned down. It was 
believed that the visitors would find their way to the cultural cen­
ter in Doetinchem . Finally, Doetinchem’s dem ographics showed 
that the num ber o f  well-educated, wealthy people had increased. 
Such people like to visit cultural centers. H oeken hypothesized 
that the causal evidence would be more persuasive than either the 
anecdotal or the statistical evidence. He based the hypothesis on 
a study conducted by Slusher and Anderson (1996).
Slusher and A nderson (1996) studied the relative persuasive­
ness o f statistical and causal evidence. The claim  that Aids is not 
spread by casual contact was either supported by statistical or by 
causal evidence. The statistical evidence contained inform ation 
such as “A  study o f  more than 10 0  people in fam ilies where there 
was a person with A ID S without the knowledge o f the fam ily and 
in which norm al fam ily interactions such as hugging, k issing, 
eating together, sleeping together, etc., took place revealed not a 
single case o f  A ID S tran sm ission .” The causal evidence con­
tained inform ation such as “The A ID S virus is not concentrated 
in saliva. The virus has to be present in h igh concentration to 
infect another person and even then, it m ust get into that per­
son’s bloodstream .” Slusher and A nderson ’s participants were 
m ore convinced by the causal evidence than by the statistical evi­
dence.
Hoeken (2001b) com pares the relative persuasiveness o f  anec­
dotal, statistical, and causal evidence. The use o f  statistical evi­
dence to support the claim  about the cultural center’s profitabil­
ity proved m ore convincing than the u se  o f  either causal or 
anecdotal evidence. The latter two did not differ from  each other. 
A s in the previous study, participants were asked to rate the 
strength o f  the evidence. In this case, the anecdotal evidence was 
rated as weaker than the statistical and causal evidence (with the 
latter two not differing from  each other). Again, there was a dis­
crepancy between the perceived and actual persuasiveness. 
W hereas the causal evidence was just as ineffective as the anec­
dotal evidence in altering the acceptance o f  the claim, it was con­
sidered stronger than the anecdotal evidence. Again, the relative 
strength o f  the causal evidence m ay only have becom e apparent 
when the participants were asked to reflect upon it.
H oeken’s results (2001b) diverge from  those o f  Slush er and 
Anderson (1996). W hereas the latter reported the causal evidence 
to be m ore convincing than statistical evidence, H oeken found 
the reversed pattern. A  closer inspection o f the causal evidence 
used by Slusher and A nderson revealed that this evidence 
appears to be provided by scientists. For instance, you need spe­
cial equipm ent and training to assess the concentration o f a virus 
in saliva. The causal evidence used in the experim ent by Hoeken 
m ay have lacked such a scientific aura. Perhaps this explains the 
difference in results.
1.4  The research question
The studies discussed above appear to reveal that evidence types 
m ay differ with respect to their relative persuasiveness. However, 
the results are rather equivocal. W hich type o f evidence is more 
persuasive than the other differs from  study to study. The inter­
pretation o f  the results is even m ore complicated because in each
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study only one claim  and one instantiation o f  an evidence type 
were used. Consequently, a sign ificant difference im plies only 
that when the sam e claim  and the sam e evidence are rated by a 
sim ilar num ber o f  participants (who resem ble the original ones), 
a sim ilar difference would be obtained. A  sign ificant difference 
between one instantiation o f  different evidence types cannot be 
generalized to other instantiations o f  the sam e evidence type.
In this study, we have tried to extend the results o f  these previ­
ous studies in two ways. First, we com pared directly the relative 
persuasiveness o f  four types o f evidence: anecdotal, statistical, 
causal, and expert evidence. To our knowledge, this constitutes the 
first experim ent in which persuasiveness o f  these four evidence 
types is compared directly. Second, we had participants rate a large 
num ber o f  claim s (instead o f  just one). Anecdotal, statistical, 
causal, and expert evidence was developed for each claim. Each 
participant rated the acceptability o f  claims that were supported by 
anecdotal evidence, by statistical evidence, by causal evidence, and 
by expert evidence. This research set-up enables us not only to 
generalize our findings over participants, but also over the types 
o f evidence used in our study. Our research question was:
Are there differences in the persuasiveness o f  anecdotal, sta­
tistical, causal, and expert evidence?
2  M e t h o d
To answer the research question, twenty probability claim s were 
presented to 16 0  participants. These claims were either presented 
without evidence, or with one o f  the four types o f  evidence. The 
participants rated the probability that the consequence expressed 
in the claim  would occur.
2.1 Material
The m aterial consisted o f  twenty claim s in  which a relation was 
stated between the presence o f an attribute and the occurrence o f 
a consequence, for instance:
O ntspanningsruim tes in  kantoren leiden tot een sterke dal- 
ing van het ziekteverzuim  in Nederland.
(Relaxation room s in offices lead to a sharp decline in absen­
teeism  due to illness in the Netherlands.)
Four types o f  evidence were construed for each claim. The anec­
dotal evidence typically consisted o f  the experience o f  one ind i­
vidual, for instance:
Thom as Kepers werkt in een groot kantorenpand in de rand- 
stad. Sinds hij gebruik maakt van de gezam enlijk relax-ruimte 
op de tweede verdieping van zijn kantoor, heeft hij zich nooit 
m eer ziek gemeld.
(Thom as Kepers w orks in a large office in the Randstad 
conurbation. H e has not had to call in  sick since he started 
using the relaxation room  on the second floor.)
The statistical evidence consisted o f  a num erical sum m ary o f  
large num ber o f  cases, for instance:
Van 19 9 0  tot 2 0 0 0  w erd er een grootschalig onderzoek 
. gedaan naar de effecten van ontspanningsm ogelijkheden op 
het werk. Bij bedrijven die deze voorzieningen boden, bleek 
24 %  m inder ziekteverzuim  voor te kom en.
(From 19 9 0  till 2 0 0 2 , a large-scale study was conducted on 
the effects o f  relaxation facilities at work. In com panies that 
offered such facilities, absenteeism  due to illness occurred 
24%  less often.)
T he causal evidence consisted o f  providing relationships that 
could explain w hy the consequence had to occur, for instance: 
Door relax-kam ers op het werk te plaatsen, kunnen werkne- 
m ers een uur per dag ontspannen tijdens hun drukke werlcza- 
amheden. Daardoor verm indert de werkdruk en de stress van 
de werknem ers, wat leidt tot gezondere werknem ers.
(Providing relaxation room s at w ork m eans em ployees are 
able to relax from  their dem anding job for an hour a day. A s a 
result, pressure and stress caused by work decreases in these 
em ployees, which leads to m ore healthy employees.)
Finally, the expert evidence consisted o f  quoting an authority who 
only rephrased the claim, for instance:
Prof. de Boer is een vooraanstaand onderzoelcer op het gebied 
van vrije tijd en bedrijf. In  zijn  boek “ Ruim te voor ontspan- 
n in g” brengt hij naar voren dat het inrichten van ontspan- 
ningsruim ten het aantal zielcen verm indert.
(Professor de Boer is a leading scholar in the field  o f  leisure 
tim e and organization. In  his book Room fo r  Relaxation  he 
claim s that the provision o f  relaxation room s decreases the 
num ber o f  people taking tim e o ff from  work due to illness.)
For each o f  the twenty claim s, four different types o f  evidence 
were constructed along the lines described above. The different 
types o f evidence were kept approxim ately equally long.
2.2  Participants
A total o f 16 0  participants took part in the experiment. The num ­
ber o f w om en was slightly higher (84) than the num ber o f  m en 
(76). Their ages ranged from  17  to 85, with a m ean o f  29 .7 . The 
level o f  education ranged from  high school to university (master’s 
degree).
2.3 Design
Each participant rated the probability o f  twenty claim s, fou r o f 
which were supported by anecdotal evidence, four by statistical 
evidence, fou r by causal evidence, fou r by expert evidence, and 
four claim s that w ere not supported by any evidence. U sin g  a 
latin square design ensured that each participant rated the prob­
ability o f all twenty claim s w hereas each claim  in  com bination 
with each type o f  evidence was rated by an equal num ber o f  par­
ticipants. This resulted in  five different versions o f  the experi­
m ental booklet. The order in  w hich the claim s w ere presented 
was identical in each o f the versions.
2.4  Instrumentation
The twenty claim s (and evidence) were presented in an experi­
mental booklet. A fter each short text, the claim  was repeated and 
participants had to indicate on a 5-point scale how  likely they 
regarded the consequence to occur, for instance:
Relaxation room s in offices lead to a sharp decline in absen­
teeism  due to illness in the Netherlands.
Very unlikely 1 2 3 4 5  Very likely
Then, they were asked to indicate their opinion on the com pre­
hensibility o f  the reasoning.
I find this reasoning
Very hard to understand 1 2 3 4 5  Very easy to understand
The latter question was only asked i f  the claim  was supported by 
evidence. It was included to check w hether certain types o f  evi­
dence were considere m ore com plex than others. At the end o f 
the booklet, the participant’s age, sex, and h ighest level o f  educa­
tion were asked for.
2.5 Procedure
The participants were rail passengers. They w ere asked whether 
they were w illin g  to participate in a study w hich w ould  inquire 
about their opinion on several issues. I f  they agreed to participate, 
they random ly received an experim ental booklet and any ques­
tions were answ ered. A fter they had filled out the booklet, they 
were told about the study’s goal. On average, filling out the book­
let took about 15 m inutes.
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The probability o f  claim s that were not supported by evidence 
was rated by 32 participants. The average score o f these 32 par­
ticipants provided a baseline for assessing the contribution o f the 
different types o f  evidence to the acceptance o f the claim. To that 
end, the average score o f  the no-evidence condition was sub­
tracted from  the scores in the other conditions (evidence present). 
Table 1 displays the average difference scores as a function o f the 
d ifferent evidence types together w ith the com prehensibility 
scores for these evidence types.
Table 1 The mean probability and comprehensibility scores (1 = very hard to 
understand, 5 = very easy to understand) as a function of evidence type 
(standard deviation between parentheses).
Evidence type Probability Comprehensibility
Anecdotal 0.13 (0.72) 3.91 (0.90)
Statistical 0.51 (0.69) 3.98 (0.80)
Causal 0.41 (0.66) 4.02 (0.73)
Expert 0.39 (0.62) 3.93 (0.78)
For the probability scores, a m ain effect o f  evidence type was 
found for the analysis by participants (Fi (3,157) = 10.77, p  < .00 1, 
(2 =  .17) as well as for the analysis by stim uli (Fz (3, 17) = 12 .4 4 , 
p  < .0 0 1, (2 =  .69). Planned com parisons revealed that anecdotal 
evidence led to lower (difference) scores than statistical, causal, 
and expert evidence (analysis by participants: all p-values < .00 1; 
analysis by stimuli: p <  .0 0 x, p  < .01, p  < .05, respectively). For the 
analysis by participants, there was a trend towards statistical evi­
dence being m ore persuasive than causal and expert evidence, 
but these com parisons did not reach conventional levels o f  s ig ­
nificance (p = .09 , p  = .07, respectively). For the analysis by stim ­
uli, these trends did not arise (p =  .23, p  = .16 , respectively).1 
There were no effects o f evidence type on com prehensibility (Fi 
(3, 157) = 1.68 , p  =  .17; Fz  (3, 17) = 1.03, p  =  .40).
4  D i s c u s s i o n
The question w hether there are differences with respect to the 
persuasiveness o f  the evidence types can be answ ered a ffirm a­
tively. A s was the case in the studies reported on by Baesler and 
Burgoon (1994) and H oeken (2001b), anecdotal evidence proved 
less persuasive than statistical evidence. In contrast to the results 
obtained by H oeken (2001b), causal evidence was m ore persua­
sive than anecdotal evidence in this experim ent. For the first 
tim e, the persuasiveness o f  expert evidence was com pared 
directly to that o f  anecdotal, statistical, and causal evidence. It 
proved to be m ore persuasive than anecdotal evidence, and 
equally persuasive as statistical and causal evidence.
A n im portant difference with the previous studies is that the 
num ber o f  claim s and evidence types that have been rated make 
it possible to draw m ore general conclusions with respect to the 
relative persuasiveness o f  different evidence types. I f  w e were to 
present another set o f  twenty claim s and evidence types to this 
sam e set o f  participants, it is h ighly probable that the anecdotal 
evidence w ould once again be less persuasive com pared to the 
other types o f evidence. Noteworthy is the size o f  this effect ((2 = 
.69). M ore than two-thirds o f the variance in the probability rat­
ings can be ascribed to the different types o f evidence. This is a 
very large effect im plying that argum ent type is a strong predic­
tor o f the acceptance o f  a claim.
These results appear to w arrant the claim  that anecdotal evi­
dence is less persuasive com pared to the other evidence types. 
However, this conclusion m ay need som e modification. Depend­
ing on the type o f  claim , anecdotal evidence can lead to two dif­
ferent argum entation schem es. W hen anecdotal evidence is used 
to support a general claim  about a class o f  events, this yields a 
sym ptom atic argum entation schem e. W hen anecdotal evidence 
is used  to support a specific claim  about a specific event, this 
yields a sim ilarity argum entation schem e (van Eem eren &  Groo- 
tendorst, 19 9 2 ). The persuasiveness o f anecdotal evidence m ay 
differ as a result o f  the argum entation schem e it is part of.
An exam ple m ay clarify this. Consider the following anecdotal 
evidence: Thom as Kepers works in a large office in the Randstad 
conurbation. He has not had to call in sick since he started using 
the relaxation room  on the second floor. In the experim ent, this 
type o f  evidence was used to support general claim s such as: 
Relaxation room s in offices lead to a sharp decline o f  absence 
through illness in the Netherlands. Such a com bination o f  type 
o f  evidence and type o f claim  yields a sym ptom atic argum enta­
tion schem e. The sam e anecdotal evidence also could have been 
used  to support the claim  that a colleague o f  Thom as Kepers 
should u se  the relaxation room . In  that case, the anecdotal evi­
dence is part o f a sim ilarity argumentation scheme, and the more 
sim ilar the colleague and Thom as Kepers are, the m ore persua­
sive the evidence should be.
The results o f the current study indicate that anecdotal evidence 
is, in general, less persuasive than statistical, causal, and expert 
evidence. The question rem ains whether this difference is 
restricted to anecdotal evidence that is part o f  a sym ptom atic 
argum entation schem e. In argum entation theory, people are 
warned against draw ing general conclusions on the basis o f 
insu fficient observations. The participants in this experim ent 
appear to have taken this w arn ing seriously. The question 
whether anecdotal evidence that is part o f a sim ilarity argum en­
tation schem e is as persuasive as the other types o f  evidence, 
rem ains unansw ered. We hope to address this in  further 
research.
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